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RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-WAR IRAQ: STEPS, MISSTEPS, AND A CALL TO MAXIMIZE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR IRAQI-LED PROCESSES
We achieved the important objective of removing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by leading a coalition of the willing. Building a new structure of peace requires a wider basis.
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
On April 9, 2003, the world witnessed the symbolic demise of the despotic rule of Saddam
Hussein as his statue in downtown Baghdad was unceremoniously toppled. 1 A day earlier, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair issued a joint statement announcing the Coalition's objectives for reconstructing the "new Iraq." 2 A primary Coalition goal was to set conditions in which Iraqis could establish "a united, representative government that upholds human rights and the rule of law as cornerstones of democracy." 3 The leaders vowed that in creating this environment the Coalition "will work with its allies, other bilateral donors, and with the United Nations and other international institutions." 4 In an offer of the "olive branch" to the United Nations (UN) and the international community after rancorous disagreement leading up to the Coalition's decision to go to war with Iraq, 5 Bush and Blair proclaimed that " [t] he United Nations has a vital role to play in the reconstruction of Iraq" and called upon "the international community to join with [the Coalition] in ensuring a democratic and secure future for the Iraqi people." 6 Assessments conducted following the Coalition's military victory revealed an Iraqi legal system riddled with corruption; judicial independence was a relic of history. In addition, legal infrastructure courts, prisons, and police stations  was decayed or destroyed. 7 Respect for the law was nowhere to be seen. Looters plundered at will and stoplights and traffic police were universally ignored. 8 Public confidence that justice could be obtained under the law was virtually non-existent. Reversing a mindset that developed over thirty-five years of Ba'ath tyranny and convincing Iraqis to re-embrace democratic notions of justice would be no small task. There seemed more than enough work to keep the Coalition, interim Iraqi leaders, the UN, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) very busy in restoring the rule of law in post-Saddam Iraq.
After briefly discussing the history of Iraq's legal system and the corruption occasioned by years of Ba'ath rule, the paper highlights the early reforms initiated by the Coalition and examines why international rule of law roles have thus far been limited. The paper then traces the steps and, at times, missteps of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 9 and the laterformed Governing Council of Iraq (Governing Council) 10 as they struggled with challenging rule of law processes. The paper focuses particularly on: (1) prosecuting and punishing Ba'ath leaders responsible for atrocities; (2) providing redress to victims of Saddam's brutal dictatorship, particularly those forced from their homes to advance political objectives; and (3) purging Ba'ath wrongdoers from positions of power, while providing a means of reconciliation for the many who did not commit serious offenses, but who nevertheless benefited from their affiliation with the Ba'ath Party.
The paper identifies specific roles the UN and other international actors are well-suited to play in developing and implementing these critical processes. The paper highlights the extensive transitional justice expertise and experience in the areas under examination and argues that increased international support to these "Iraqi-owned" processes will enhance the likelihood of their success. The paper concludes by urging the CPA and Governing Council not to lose focus of rule of law issues or to miss the opportunity to ensure much needed international help as the scheduled transfer of authority to a new transitional government approaches.
BACKGROUND

OVERVIEW OF THE IRAQI LEGAL SYSTEM
Iraq claims a proud legal heritage. The famous Babylonian Code of Hammurabi provides the earliest known comprehensive body of published law. 11 Notwithstanding its deep historical roots, modern Iraqi jurisprudence is primarily a product of the Ottoman Empire. 12 During the earlier periods of the Ottomans, Islamic law ("Shari-ah") governed Iraq and other Arab lands that formed the Empire. During the nineteenth century, however, the Ottomans, inspired by legal codes of leading western European powers, promulgated major codes to govern commerce, property rights, and civil and criminal law and procedure. These codes remained largely in tact following the post-World War I dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and, as modified by the influences of more recent Egyptian codes, still form a significant part of current Iraqi jurisprudence. 13 Thus, Iraq is characterized as a civil code state, although some vestiges of common law influences from the period of British administration after World War I remain. 46 They indicate that Iraqis are certainly willing to conduct the trials and strongly dispute the contention they are incapable, noting that with some training and assistance, Iraqi jurists will be up to the task. 47 In addition, they fear that, like the former Yugoslavian tribunal, an international proceeding could be held in a foreign venue in a foreign tongue, depriving most Iraqis of the long-awaited opportunity to witness Saddam and his cronies brought to justice. Citing the prosecutions in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, they also note that international tribunals have proved to be slow, cumbersome, and costly. 48 
CREATION OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
The arguments advanced by proponents for an Iraqi-run tribunal generally carried the day.
On December Under the statute, trials will be conducted before five-judge panels, with judgments rendered based on a simple majority. Decisions of the Trial Chambers are reviewable by a nine-member Appeals Chamber. The President of the Appeals Chamber serves as the President of the Tribunal and is required to draft rules of procedure and evidence to govern trials. The statute also directs the Governing Council to appoint investigative judges to gather evidence and issue subpoenas, warrants, and indictments, and independent prosecutors to take the cases to trial.
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In an attempt to assuage those supporting an ad hoc international or hybrid tribunal, the statute authorizes the Governing Council, "if it deems necessary," to appoint experienced nonIraqi judges to the trial and appellate panels. 54 In addition, the statute requires the appointment of non-Iraqi nationals to advise and observe the work of the investigative judges, prosecutors, and trial and appellate judges to ensure adherence to internationally-accepted notions of due process and proper application of international law. The statute provides that in selecting these non-Iraqi experts, tribunal authorities may "request assistance from the international community, including the United Nations." 55 While the statute requires that a suspect's principal lawyer be an Iraqi, international counsel may augment the defense team. In addition, as experience has shown, the costs in prosecuting lead ers of deposed regimes for serious international crimes can be astronomical. 60 Currently, all expenses of the IST are to be borne by the "regular budget of the Government of Iraq." 61 The international community reasonably could be expected to bear a share of these costs commensurate with the degree of their participation in the process. Savings realized as a result of international funding could be used to finance victims' compensation programs. Finally, assuming the death penalty is an available punishment, many talented international experts may decline the invitation to participate in the process, even as advisors and observers. 62 By enhancing the roles allocated to international participants, the CPA and Governing Council should be able to persuade capable and qualified experts, even those with a general opposition to capital punishment, to assist. Maximized international participation in an Iraqi-controlled process is the best means to achieve legitimate national and international objectives.
REDRESS FOR ABUSES
Providing redress through legal processes to the victims of the tyranny of Saddam's Ba'athist regime is also an important element of the process of re-establishing the rule of law in post-conflict Iraq. Even remedies that fall short of a "make-whole" standard can go far to restore in victims a conviction that justice may be obtained under the law. Iraqis sought to return to their homes and reclaim lands and property they had formerly occupied. In some cases, these re-occupations were aided by armed Kurdish militia ("pesh merga"). 71 The Coalition recognized that these self-help measures could result in violent altercations, as well as the secondary displacement of the pre-war occupants. Consequently, Coalition authorities implemented a policy designed to preserve the pre-war status quo and defer the resolution of property disputes until formal legal processes could be established.
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Notwithstanding the Coalition's "stay put" policy and even the occasional eviction by public sector positions, and barred all "full members" from serving in any of the top three layers of management in national ministries or in other government institutions like universities and hospitals. Bremer's order also directed authorities to investigate individuals subject to removal from government posts for prior criminal conduct. The CPA reserved authority to make exceptions to the employment bans on a case-by-case basis. 97 Later, the Governing Council, apparently acting independently o f the CPA, established the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission (HNDC). In a subsequent CPA order, Administrator Bremer acknowledged the HNDC's creation, ratified actions it had taken, and delegated HNDC the authority to implement de-Ba'athification consistent with prior CPA pronouncements. The order also provided due process rights for civil servants subject to removal for former Ba'ath affiliation, including pre-termination notice and an opportunity to present evidence and argument, as well as post-termination appeal and review rights. The CPA also granted the Governing Council authority to establish additional implementing guidance and procedures, including special rules for particular professions or categories of employees.
98
On January 11, 2 004, the Governing Council issued the HNDC's implementing instructions. The guidance generally followed earlier CPA directives, although it afforded new appeal rights to the lowest ranking "full members" ("Firqah"), authorized judicial appeal of decisions by the HNDC sustaining removals, and granted pensions to some low-level former Party members whose employment was terminated. The Governing Council also announced that guidance for de-Ba'athification of trade associations and certain private sector organizations would be forthcoming. 99 
REINTEGRATION
Once former Ba'athists have paid an appropriate penalty commensurate with the degree of their culpability, they must have the ability to reintegrate into society and pursue equal opportunity under the law. To date, however, the CPA and Governing Council have not proposed a reconciliation process, apparently waiting until prosecutions and programs to redress victims are underway. 100 While this hesitancy is understandable, it may be shortsighted.
Although the processes of retribution, redress, and reconciliation may end up occurring more or less sequentially, the likelihood of achieving the overall objectives will be increased by having a comprehensive, integrated, and complementary strategy at the outset.
101
Perhaps the greatest challenge will be the reintegration of the tens or hundreds of Consistent with existing Iraqi criminal law regarding immunity, the perpetrator must make a full and truthful confession and fully cooperate with investigators by identifying other wrongdoers. The draft law also requires the person seeking amnesty to agree to accept the punishment of the committee, make a public apology, and pledge not to commit future offenses.
If the accused fails to comply with all the conditions for amnesty, the matter could be referred to the public prosecutor for investigation and prosecution in a court of competent jurisdiction. 108 In the IJA proposal, the amnesty and reconciliation committees have broad latitude to fashion appropriate punishments, including ordering the accused to make a personal payment to the victim and perform prescribed community service for a period of up to one year.
Decisions of the committees may be reviewed by appropriate appellate courts. To ensure that future generations would be reminded of the dark Ba'ath era, all crimes would be entered into a public registry and appropriate memorials created for victims.
109
The IJA model, developed with international assistance, has considerable appeal. It recognizes that international crimes and serious domestic offenses must be prosecuted, but strikes a pragmatic balance between the need for accountability with the realities of the judicial capacity to handle the volume of potential lesser-offense cases. Unlike many other reconciliation processes, the IJA's plan extensively incorporates existing national law and cultural norms. 110 In addition, it makes full and voluntary confession a precursor to any amnesty and recognizes the rights of victims to compensation for injuries. It also provides for appropriate lustration mechanisms to ensure transparency and awareness of individual wrongdoing, now and in the future.
ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ROLES
Although there are examples of truth and reconciliation processes sponsored, financed, and operated by the UN and other international organizations, 111 reconciliation more than any other rule of law process  requires national "ownership" to succeed. However, given the vast experience and expertise developed in the international community in the past thirty years with various reconciliation models, international experts could provide valuable advice and assistance in determining whether the IJA model or some other variation should be adopted in Iraq and in determining how best to incorporate both Iraqi and international norms. They could also advise and assist in drafting enabling documents and setting up databases and registries.
In addition, international experts could conduct training for investigators, commissioners, and jurists involved in the process. 112 Moreover, international assistance could be sought to finance these undertakings.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to enhance effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and legitimacy in each of the foregoing rule of law processes, the CPA and Governing Council should take the following specific actions:
Prosecutions -
• Appoint one or more international judges (but not a majority) to sit on the trial and appellate tribunals created by the IST statute • Consult with the UN and international experts to identify qualified experts to serve as advisors and observers in preparing and taking cases to trial before the IST • Request international assistance in drafting IST rules of procedure and evidence to ensure compliance with internationally-accepted norms 
CONCLUSION
Currently, national and international attention is focused almost exclusively on the political transition of sovereignty. Very little consideration is being given to outstanding rule of law issues. While this focus is driven by political expediencies and pre-established deadlines, it may, in some cases, put the proverbial cart before the horse. For example, it is difficult to imagine how orderly voter registration and elections in critical cultural flashpoints like Kirkuk can occur until there is a general agreement on disputed property claims in the area. In addition, such an orientation may be myopic. As Paddy Ashdown, the former UN High Representative in Bosnia noted:
In Bosnia, we thought that democracy was the highest priority and we measured it by the number of elections we could organize. In hindsight, we should have put the establishment of rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, and public confidence in police and courts. We should do well to reflect on this as we formulate our plans for Afghanistan, and perhaps, Iraq. 25 Among other things, the CPA abolished the special security courts that had been established to punish enemies of the former regime without due process, suspended portions of the penal code that had been used by the Ba'ath regime as tools of repression, and modified other parts of the penal code to strengthen internal security and stability. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 2, "Dissolution of More recently, however, the CPA has delegated significant responsibilities to the Council, including authority to establish a tribunal to prosecute Iraqis accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a claims commission to receive and resolve real property claims arising from Ba'athist policies and forced relocations, a public integrity commission to enforce anti-corruption laws and ethical standards for public employees, and a de-Ba'athification commission to purge the government and elements of society of Ba'athist leaders and influences. 39 In the fall of 2003, the security situation in Iraq began to erode and Coalition forces suffered a growing number of casualties from an emboldened insurgency. As a result, domestic and international pressure began to mount on the Coalition to seek greater international involvement for both security and reconstruction. On October 16, 2003 , the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1511 which, among other things, invited the Governing Council, in coordination with the CPA, to provide a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding democratic elections and generally resolved that the UN "should strengthen its vital role in Iraq. Representatives of the CPA and Governing Council expressed a desire for the UN to play an active role in the plan's implementation. See UN Report of 5 December, par. 64. Given the timeline in the November agreement, however, the Secretary General noted that the UN would need to focus on political transition, although it would remain available to assist in other areas, such as promoting and institutionalizing the rule of law, provided that "the substance of the role allocated to the United Nations is proportionate to the risks [the United Nations] are being asked to take . . .". Ibid., pars. 69, 76, 108, 112. A long-anticipated meeting on January 19, 2004 , was supposed to be the forum for the Coalition, Governing Council, and UN leadership to discuss specific roles for the UN and the international community in post-war Iraq. See UN Report of 5 December, par. 81. However, after Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani's opposition to the proposed caucus method of selecting a transitional government, the only item on the agenda was the feasibility of early elections or other methods to transfer power. Hamza Hendawi, "Iraqis, Occupation Authorities Look to United Nations to Solve Political Impasse," Tampa Under this policy, Coalition personnel were prohibited from adjudicating or attempting to mediate property disputes, although they were authorized to detain individuals who attempted to use force to reoccupy property. Pending the establishment of legal processes, military officials were to direct putative claimants to preserve documents and seek temporary shelter with relatives or in shelters provided by humanitarian agencies.
